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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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 Concerns about the US Military-Industrial complex have seemed a permanent fixture in 
the DoD.  Initial studies outlined the uniqueness of the market, but continued utilization of 
classic economic approach continues with little explanatory power.  This paper offers an 
alternative approach using transaction-costs analysis and the explanatory power of the New 
Institutional Economic and Public Choice School. The approach provides explanatory power in 
the defense markets’ mix of the invisible and visible hands at work and provides a framework for 
assessing viable policy alternatives that could provide increased efficiency while maintaining our 
principles of freedom.   
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this draft paper are those of the author and do not reflect 
the policy of MCR, Inc.  This is a working paper; do not quote without permission.  The other 
usual disclaimers apply. 
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In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted 
influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. 
    President Dwight D. Eisenhower Farewell Address,       
         January 17, 1961 
Still much of the public discussion of weapons acquisition problems proceeds as if the 
terms “competition,” “price,” “buying,” and “seller” had the meanings they do in a market 
system.                  (Peck & Scherer, 1962) 
As the United States shifted from arsenals to more and more utilization of private firms in 
the acquisition of weapon systems, concerns grew about the military-industrial complex.   Those 
concerns were most famously noted by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his farewell address 
in 1961. He warned, “we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether 
sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.”  By this point, the defense market(s), or 
the “military-industrial complex,” had grown to become a considerable economic factor.  The 
Korean War and Cold War (generally) had driven defense spending to over 10% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) for most of the 1950s. With such financial concerns, interest grew in 
the weapons acquisition process; and in the late 1950s, Harvard Business School conducted an 
extensive study of the industry (Peck & Scherer, 1962).  The stated purpose of the study was:  
to determine the nature of the relationship between the government and weapons 
contractors in the acquisition of advanced weapons and to analyze the effects of these 
relationships on weapons performance and the speed and cost of their acquisition.  The 
project will also recommend changes in government and business policies and practices 
having a direct and significant impart on relationships between government and 
weapons contractors. 
In their conclusion, the authors note that their analytical descriptions did not:  
yield a simple model in which a few functional relationships set forth how an economic 
process operates.  Although such models have been the stock-in-trade of economists, 
they have their limitations.  Undoubtedly such a model could be developed for the 
weapons acquisition process.  Yet given the present state of knowledge about the 
process, there is little assurance that the right simplifications would be made, or that the 
various functions would be expressed correctly, or that the interactions of those 
functions would yield an accurate description of what goes on in weapons acquisitions.  
To date, over 40 years later, no model or basic framework has emerged that provides an 
effective “description of what goes on in weapons acquisition.” 
Traditional neoclassical economic assessments of ineffective and inefficient weapons 
procurement have been published since the first analyses by Peck and Scherer, but none seem 
to have explanatory power.  Most pick up on the seemingly justified negative assessments given 
the poor performance of some weapon systems in the 60’s and 70’s.  Most have not extended 
Peck and Scherer’s assessment that the “uncertainties and risks mark the weapons acquisition 
process as unique,” nor their opinion that: 
substantial uncertainties and risks vitiate the use of familiar economic and administrative 
concepts borrowed from established institutions.  The notion of a market system is one 
 =
=
===================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=íÜÉ=ÑçìåÇ~íáçå=Ñçê=áååçî~íáçå======== - 35 - 
=
=
such inapplicable set of concepts. Still much of the public discussion of weapons 
acquisition problems proceeds as if the terms “competitions,” “price,” “buyer,” and 
“seller” had the meaning they do in a market system. 
Peck and Scherer outline specific issues in each area and conclude, “the concepts of a market 
economy are not a fruitful point of departure from formulating weapons acquisition policy.” This 
conclusion is vital because its profundity has not been duplicated in published form since. 
Unfortunately, the emphasis in the past 40 years has been on trying to get the defense 
market(s) to act like a viable commercial market.  Jacques Gansler (1980, 1995) in his first 
book, The Defense Industry, noted numerous problems with the operation of the defense 
market. He suggested, “to attack all of these problems, the government must implement a set of 
coordinated policies aimed at creating a viable market economy in each sector of the defense 
industry.  In fact, the solutions must begin with a clear recognition that each sector has unique 
problems requiring special corrective actions” (1980). The book outlines the unique problems 
with a central planning approach so numerous adjustments can be made to solve the “unique 
problems.”  His book ends with a seven-point plan with a focus on creating a “viable free 
market” and “integration of civilian and military business.”  The approach seems to try to fix the 
market(s) so it would fit into one of the economists’ “simple models” that can be brought to 
equilibrium neatly on the economic professor’s blackboard.   Gansler and others continued to 
write assessments with predictions of continued failures in the defense market and the resulting 
poor military capabilities.  He noted in 1982 that “reports [referring to four reports from 1980 on 
the predicted problems with the defense industry; one of these was his book], coming from a 
wide diversity of backgrounds, concluded that there are serious problems with the defense 
industry.  As a result, the United States is paying over $50 billion a year for military equipment 
and not getting its money’s worth.  Nor can the industry supplying this equipment expand rapidly 
enough to make a difference in the outcome of any conflict of likely duration” (Gansler, 1982).  
But, it was this expansion in the early 80’s by the Reagan administration that provided the 
fundamental system that performed so well just nine years later in Desert Storm.    
Post-Desert Storm, Gansler and others continued to lay out a prescription of strategies 
for fixing the market, noting the need for the specialized defense firms to be more commercial-
oriented and to build systems that have dual uses, both commercial and military.  He warned 
that “if the Pentagon does not implement such an integration strategy soon, defense contractors 
will remain specialized, highly subsidized, inefficient, and ineffective at doing anything except 
building a few expensive weapons systems” (Gansler, 1993).   In his book, Defense Conversion, 
Gansler noted the continued contractions of defense firms and the continued need for defense 
firms to be more commercial-like and less defense-specialized (Gansler, 1995).  Each 
assessment seems to utilize neoclassic economic models which (in general) ignore the 
frictions—those uncertainties and risk noted by Peck and Scherer—in the market and attempt to 
find a way to equilibrium. Gansler’s long list of prescriptions pushed for government 
interventions that would make the complex acquisition system more like the commercial market 
and, thus, more able to achieve this equilibrium.  Many of these prescriptions were not 
implemented, however, even when he was appointed as the senior acquisition official for the 
Defense Department during the second term of the Clinton Administration.  His attempts to 
encourage defense firms to expand into commercial business generally failed; the industry 
continues to consolidate and has narrowed its focus on government business (Driessnack, 
2003).  So, even when the economist was placed in charge to implement his prescriptions, they 
did not happen.  The military and the industrial complex resisted and still continue to evolve 
away from the policy thrusts.  The policies of the past didn’t work because they have been 
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derived from the neoclassic models of the market.  A new approach which heads the warnings 
from Peck and Scherer is needed.   
 
NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC VIEW OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 
 
So, what is the model by which the military-industrial complex should be analyzed?  The 
researcher, in a previously published study, introduced how New Institutional Economic 
framework provides insight for the dynamics behind the consolidation of the defense industry 
and challenges the notion that the defense market(s) were inefficient (Driessnack, 2003). The 
approach took the transactional cost (TC) analysis of firms into the defense market(s) and 
provided insights into the drives behind the consolidations.  The consolidations are indications 
of a unique and functioning market(s).  In that previous text, I noted: 
Williamson calls for a test for remedies and states, our “test of whether an outcome is 
inefficient needs to recognize the constraints imposed by TC just as much as we respect 
resource and technology constraints.”  He defines this idea[, explaining] that “an 
outcome for which no feasible superior alternative can be described and implemented 
with net gains is presumed to be efficient.” The terms “feasible” and “implemented” need 
to be understood to be in the economic and political processes, in our case the US 
Constitution and the evolved political and administrative processes that influence the 
rules, both formal and informal, of the market. (Driessnack, 2003)   
Economist emphasis on rational choice and frictionless efficient markets has limited the 
models to an extent that they miss the complexity of the environment they are trying to model.  
Douglass North states:  
Integrating institutional analysis into static neoclassical theory entails modifying the 
existing body of theory.  But devising a model of economic change required the 
construction of an entire theoretical framework, because no such model exists.  Path 
dependence is the key to an analytical understanding of long-run economic change.  
The promise of this approach is that it extends the most constructive building blocks of 
neo-classical theory—both the scarcity/competition postulate and incentives as the 
driving force—but modifies that theory by incorporating incomplete information and 
subjective models of reality and the increasing returns characteristic of institutions.  The 
result is an approach that offers the promise of connecting micro level economic activity 
with the macro level incentives provided by the institutional framework.  The source of 
incremental change is the gains to be obtained by organizations and their entrepreneurs 
from acquiring skills, knowledge, and information that will enhance their objective. 
(North, 1999) 
It is this preoccupation with the neoclassical static models that researchers must break away 
from in order to build a framework at the transaction level first before we apply the lesson from 
neoclassical economics.  North is not the only one that outlines the critical nature of the 
institution in the market.  The firms and their management come to play in deciding roles in the 
efficiency of the economy.  This suggestion is outlined by Chandler in the Visible Hand, the 
Managerial Revolution in American Business.  In the defense market(s), the management starts 
with the DoD Under Secretary of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L).  The USD 
(AT&L) and other key members of the separate services (Army, Air Force, and Navy) comprise 
the senior management team over the military-industrial complex (the overall Defense 
Market(s)). Yet, this group’s (and, thus, the AT&L’s) policies are almost completely ignored in 
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the diagnoses of the industry’s consolidation and the prescriptions for a remedy (Driessnack, 
2003).   
The use of New Institutional Economics was expanded by Driessnack and King (2004) 
with a case study of the F/A-22 program which demonstrated the explanatory insight from a 
transactional-costs (TC) analysis.  The approach provided insights into the governance structure 
on the F/A-22 program (relative to the various defense contractors) and the continued emphasis 
on cost even after the prime contact competition was a decade in the past. Likewise, the 
researcher, in a case study on the Air Force Tanker Lease program, utilized the institutional 
framework along with Public Choice and Austrian economic insights (Driessnack, 2004).  In its 
conclusion, the study notes: 
the uncertainty and risks in the market that [drive] changes to these institutions and thus 
change the calculus of the individual players is a critical dynamic that needs to be added 
to our assessments of the market.  We need to recognize the limits of the bureaucratic 
and congressional institutions and engage the driver of transaction costs to better 
understand how alternative mechanisms could be employed to further lessen their 
impact.  Our assessments need to consider the “feasibility” of alternatives given a broad 
working of the institutions and the complex environments and realities of risks and 
uncertainties. (Driessnack, 2004)   
It is the assessment of the institutions and the feasibility of the alternatives that provides 
the explanatory power. 
That such explanatory power can come from New Institutional Economics and the 
transactional-cost analysis should not be surprising.  The focus at the transaction level has 
proven to be very enlightening and has been recognized in the award of two Nobel Prizes: in 
1990 to Ronald Coarse and 1993 to Douglas North.  North, in his Nobel lecture, noted:  
Neo-classical theory is simply an inappropriate tool to analyze and prescribe policies that 
will induce development.  It is concerned with the operation of markets, not with how 
markets develop. How can one prescribe policies when one doesn't understand how 
economies develop? The very methods employed by neo-classical economists have 
dictated the subject matter and militated against such a development. That theory in the 
pristine form that gave it mathematical precision and elegance modeled a frictionless 
and static world. When applied to economic history and development it focused on 
technological development and more recently human capital investment, but ignored the 
incentive structure embodied in institutions that determined the extent of societal 
investment in those factors. In the analysis of economic performance through time it 
contained two erroneous assumptions: one that institutions do not matter and two that 
time does not matter. (North, 1999)  
North was focused on the development of economies, but his methods, generally those of New 
Institutional Economics, are enlightening in regards to the problems outlined over 40 years ago 
by Peck and Scherer.  North continues to explain the critical nature of understanding the 
institutions that drive the market(s):   
Institutions form the incentive structure of a society and the political and economic 
institutions, in consequence, are the underlying determinant of economic performance. 
Time as it relates to economic and societal change is the dimension in which the 
learning process of human beings shapes the way institutions evolve. That is, the beliefs 
 =
=
===================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=íÜÉ=ÑçìåÇ~íáçå=Ñçê=áååçî~íáçå======== - 38 - 
=
=
that individuals, groups, and societies hold which determine choices are a consequence 
of learning through time—not just the span of an individual's life or of a generation of a 
society but the learning embodied in individuals, groups, and societies that is cumulative 
through time and passed on intergenerationally by the culture of a society.  
This then drives us in the defense market(s) to include the evolving Public Choice field in 
economics which enjoyed Nobel Prize winner James Buchanan in 1986. 
The integration of New Institutional Economics and Public Choice was first outlined by 
the researcher in 2003. That study explained that, “to further understand the story of the 
defense firm consolidation[,] we will need to add an additional lens from the insights of the 
Public Choice community” (Driessnack, 2003).  The combination of the New Institutional view of 
the firm and the Public Choice view of the dynamics from the political communities should 
provide the detailed framework in which insight into the whole military-industrial complex can be 
found.  This combination falls into the Wilsonian view that institutions do matter and affect the 
overall calculus of the politicians and the bureaucrats (both career civilian and military officers). 
Yet, the theory is an expansion of the Wilsonian view in that the institutions are analyzed at a 
transaction-cost level.  Researchers (Coase, 1988; North, 1999; Williamson, 1975, 1985; etc.) 
have looked at the formation of firms as attempts to reduced transaction costs in a manner that 
is superior to other alternatives in the market; likewise, we need to look at how the formation of 
bureaucracies (such as AT&L and the Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) organizations) at 
various levels of the government are also attempts to reduce transaction costs in a manner that 
is superior to other alternatives in the political market.  The question is not whether  
bureaucracies are efficient in comparison to the Chicago School of factionalist transactions in a 
price-clearing market, but whether they are reasonable accommodations of the current market 
environment’s realistic transaction costs.  
Dixit, in his book The Making of Economic Policy, A Transaction-Cost Politics 
Perspective (1996), reviews the principle agent problems in government through the view of 
transaction costs.  He notes the information asymmetries and the impacts on incentive 
schemes; he also mentions the “economist’s standard and more direct answer to such problems 
(information asymmetries) is to design an appropriate incentive scheme.”  Dixit comments on 
the studies of Wilson, Holmstrom and Milgron; these researchers have noted that incentive 
schemes are often found to be very low-powered; so, instead of adhering to these schemes, 
government agencies are subject to various constraints (Dixit, 1996).  The lower-power 
incentives are concluded to be a product of the multitasking and multiprincipal agencies.  Dixit 
reviews various schemes and summaries—making a distinction among: 
different levels of efficiency in the outcomes.  The hypothetical ideal with observable 
efforts and Coasean bargaining between all principles and the agent would be the first-
best.  Respecting the information asymmetry but allowing all principals to get together 
and offer a combined incentive scheme would give the second-best.  If the principals 
cannot be so united, their Nash equilibrium is[,] in general[,] a third-best.  In these formal 
terms, the result above says that the third-best outcome that is achieved has very low-
powered incentives. (Dixit, 1996)   
Dixit accepts the analysis “that government bureaucracies often have low-powered 
incentives and are subjected to constraints on their behaviors.”  Yet, he does not accept the 
“often claimed to be proof inefficiency of government.”  In view of transaction-costs analysis and 
understanding of various institutions, would the lack of incentives and proliferation of constraints 
actually “be a reasonable way for the system to cope with the transaction costs”?  The 
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mechanisms that have been developed to cope with transaction costs in a political system are 
driven by the same forces that drive various mechanisms in the firm.  The particular 
mechanisms are different, but they are driven by the various transaction costs realized around 
the construct of the rules of the game.  The public-sector’s rules are not the same faced by 
commercial firms; thus, a comparison of the mechanisms is of little use.  The better analysis is 
to look at the role played by transaction costs—as was done in the analysis of firms in various 
industries by Chandler (1977), Williamson (1975, 1985) and North (1999).  Applying the 
resulting mechanisms of such analysis on firms in particular sectors and to other firms in other 
sectors is of little use.  Just as these New Institutional economists have found differing 
mechanisms in each industry, so will we find such differences in the Defense Market(s).  It is 
likely not just a market, but an interconnected set of markets that start inside the Pentagon 
among bureaucracies to Prime contractors and their sub-vendors.  I propose it will be most 
useful to view the DoD’s AT&L bureaucracy as a large conglomerate firm with numerous 
operating divisions that are not and should not be operated under a common set of prescriptive 
rules. 
The analysis done by many looks at particular prescriptions that would fix specific 
narrow concerns with reported poor incentives, adverse constraints or inefficient mechanisms.  
Dixit notes that we must consider the outcome of any alternatives on the full spectrum of 
decision making in the government. “If the best outcome we would like to see violates the 
incentive constraints, then an attempt to implement it may in fact end up producing something 
even worse than the current situation, unsatisfactory though that may be.”  When judging “the 
performance of a policymaking system, they should admit the legitimacy of noneconomic goals 
and ask if a feature of the outcome that appears prima facie inefficient is in fact a reasonable 
way of striking a balance between the various interest, or multiple principals, given the 
transaction constraints” (Dixit, 1996).  
Another view is a polycentric political system which recognizes that “multiple authorities 
serve overlapping jurisdictions.”  McGinnis agrees with Dixit in that the polycentric games view 
“demonstrates that actions that seem irrational in one context may be perfectly understandable 
once analysis incorporates that actor’s strategic interactions with other actors” (McGinnis, 
2000). This approach might seem far off the New Institutional or Public Choice approach, but 
Ostrom and Ostrom point out the similarities in Coase’s firm employee and Tulluck’s “economic 
man.”  Coase indicated that efficiency, given the set of rules (contracts), can be enhanced, while 
Tulluck asserts the “economic man” distorts information and, thus, degrades efficiencies.  The 
Ostroms point out that both Coase and Tulluck recognize the limits of the firm or bureaucratic 
organization.  That traditional theory of public administration would not recognize the limit 
(McGinnis, 2000). But, we also need to look at this from the other side; can not the bureaucratic 
organization (if established appropriately) reduce costs as the firm does in the market?  
Buchanan and Tulluck discuss two type of costs: external and decision making.  The costs that 
an individual expects to have as a result of decisions that deviate from preferences and impose 
costs upon individuals are external.  The decision-making costs are the transactional costs, the 
expenditures of resources and the forgone opportunities in the decision-making process 
(McGinnis, 2000). These costs are affected by the rules about the rules—the constitutional 
framework.  Expected costs would reach zero if all were required to agree, but then decision-
making costs would greatly increase as managers attempted to reach the unanimous 
agreement.  The calculus of the consent is when these two cost curves intersect.  Different 
situations drive different costs and, thus, different rules. So, to determine if the military-industrial 
complex is efficient or not, one must understand that this production-type function is a political-
cost function which balances the external costs with the decision costs.  These costs might be 
optimized for a particular decision, but this is too narrow of a view.  The overall efficiency of any 
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one part of the political system must envision the impacts on an overall political cost curve—not 
the individual political cost curves in any one section of the political system. 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) note:  
if, for those activities that have been shifted to the public section, the costs-minimization 
decision-making rules have not been chosen, normative statements can be made about 
certain changes in organization.  External costs imposed on individuals through the 
operation of the activity may be higher than they need be, and these costs can be 
reduced only by a change in the decision-making rules.  
This view must be understood in a broad sense of the whole system and not taken in a 
narrow view of one or several institutions in the government; likewise, one should realize the 
related costs drive each system.  For the military-industrial complex, a broader assessment 
needs to be completed to determine if the evolving decision systems really need a change in the 
decision-making rules to accomplish ever-increasing efficiency and effectiveness.   
Our challenge is to embrace a more complete analysis utilizing New Institutional and 
Public Choice tools in a manner in which we can gain explanatory capability.  We will not find a 
perfect invisible hand, nor will we likely be able to adjust polices to obtain one for the military-
industrial complex.  In over 40 years, many adjustments have been made to the weapons-
acquisition process to solve noted issues, but many issues outlined by Peck and Scherer still 
exist and have not been solved through traditional approaches.  We have likely found the easy 
alternatives and now must work on the tougher issues.  These issues require a broader view so 
as to improve weapons acquisition while maintaining the overall federal government principles 
that protect the very freedoms the military is protecting.  A New Institutional and Public Choice 
approach to assess the current mix of the invisible and visible hands at work in the military-
industrial complex will provide insight into viable alternatives that should provide an overall 
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